President Bush’s recent "We care" tour of five Latin American countries was designed to demonstrate that the United States is not neglecting that region and that our country contributes significantly to the well-being of its peoples. The sub-text of the tour was something different. It was an effort to rally support for free trade in Uruguay, to promote the production of ethanol in Brazil, to bolster the war on drugs in Colombia, to gain assistance in the fight against illegal immigration in Mexico, and in general, to counter the popular appeal of Venezuelan President Chavez.

The messages back to President Bush were not very supportive of any of this agenda. His claims were met with official skepticism and his presence was met with public outrage.

The responses from government leaders were that Latin America does not appreciate U.S. efforts to weaken regional markets; that the expansion of ethanol production in Latin America depends upon the reduction of tariffs protecting U.S.-based producers; that drug production will not decrease until the U.S. decreases its demand for opiates; that immigration reform is more important than immigration reduction; and that Latin American countries are not going to choose sides between Bush and Chavez.

In short, while no government wished to embarrass President Bush, the message was that they neither shared his priorities nor were they willing to follow his lead.

The general public was not so considerate. In the streets, President Bush was met by protesters calling him "the big boss of international terrorism," "murderer," and "persona non grata." The U.S. embassy in Mexico was attacked by 2,000 demonstrators. The papers published daily pictures of riot police using night sticks and tear gas against the protesters. And most tellingly, the press published editorials and op-ed pieces challenging Bush’s claims of American generosity.

One such editorial, in a conservative Brazilian paper, was entitled "Uncle Scrooge’s Paltry Package." It noted that the $1.6 billion in assistance grants touted by President Bush as evidence of U.S. generosity amounted to only five days of America’s spending on the Iraq War and that it was a "paltry" sum compared to the billions being offered by President Chavez. Others noted that much of that $1.6 billion was actually earmarked for fighting a go-nowhere and counter-productive war on drugs in Colombia, rather than for social and economic development projects throughout the region.

All of this reminds me of a similar tour taken by then Vice President Richard Nixon in 1958. Billed as a "courtesy call" to presumably friendly nations, Nixon was surprised, and embarrassed by public demonstrations of anti-Americanism. His trip, like Bush’s, followed a long-term U.S. foreign policy towards the region of "trade not aid" and an extended period of diplomatic neglect, deafness to grievances, refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of social reform movements, and blindness to rising expectations.

Behind-the-scenes, Vice President Nixon and President Eisenhower reacted to this unanticipated turn of events with wisdom and foresight. Instead of lashing out in anger at the wounding of American pride or withdrawing in petulance from further engagement with the region, they both supported a fundamental reassessment of U.S. policy towards Latin America.

While still supporting authoritarian allies in the region and continuing to adhere to a policy of rejecting Marxism anywhere in the hemisphere during the Cold War, Eisenhower and Nixon developed a second approach. The new approach embraced representative governments and started to balance trade with programs of economic assistance. It created the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959 and supported $500 million for funding its Social Progress Fund in 1960.

Unfortunately for Nixon, time quickly ran out on the Eisenhower administration, and Nixon was subsequently defeated in his bid for the Presidency. Most of the credit for re-directing our regional policies, therefore, went to President Kennedy. His creation in 1961 of both the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps stole the limelight and became the highpoint of U.S.-Latin American relations for the rest of the Cold War.

President Bush now has about as much time as did Nixon then to make a similar reassessment of U.S.-Latin American relationships. Is he as smart as Nixon? Will he also seize the moment to undertake a fundamental re-appraisal and re-direct our policy and funding priorities with wisdom and foresight? Only time will tell. If he does not, the opportunity and the glory will again pass to his successor.

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